We investigate differences in bribing decisions among two generations from East and West Germany in a bribery game conducted as an online study (N=168). This way, we aim to explore moral considerations of individuals influenced by two formerly different institutional systems. We find a higher propensity to bribe among young Germans compared to the older generation. Young East Germans even reveal a slightly greater inclination to bribe than their West German counterparts. We conclude that preferences for personal favors may be induced among young East Germans given the tense relationship between market opportunities and conveyed cultural traits of a socialist imprint.
The German reunification provides a unique framework to study the impact of institutional conditions on moral behavior in a fairly homogeneous population. The rise of socialism in East Germany and a market-oriented system in West Germany led to separate development for about 40 years, creating individual differences induced by distinct cultural traits in both societies.
This study examines how institutional experiences during socialization influence moral considerations in economic decision-making, particularly focusing on corruption behavior through a laboratory-based bribery game experiment.
Do individuals who socialized in a socialist institutional environment differ substantially in their moral considerations from individuals of the same generation that have only experienced a market-oriented institutional environment?
Can we observe the same pattern among individuals that may only be indirectly affected by the former institutional systems but grew up uniformly in a market-oriented institutional system?
2×2 design with cohorts from East and West Germany born clearly before or after German reunification in 1990
Online lab-in-the-field experiment using classEx, implementing a strategic interaction between entrepreneurs and public officials
168 participants across four cohorts: East/West Germany × Born before/after 1990
First-round decisions to infer moral considerations instead of strategic thinking
Cohorts born after 1990 from both East and West Germany offered significantly more bribes compared to those born before 1990 (66.66% vs 38.24%, p = .018)
Among younger participants, East Germans showed slightly higher inclination to offer bribes than West Germans (70% vs 64%), though not statistically significant
Evidence suggests that harmful experiences with socialist institutions may be transmitted to individuals who socialized in a market-oriented environment
Results indicate that institutional transformation affects moral considerations differently across generations and regions
The study draws on the concept of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) to explain how individuals justify corrupt behavior to themselves through mechanisms such as diffusion of responsibility or advantageous comparisons. This framework helps understand how institutional experiences shape moral decision-making across generations.
The research contributes to understanding the relationship between market-oriented institutions and moral behavior, particularly in the context of post-socialist transformation and cultural trait convergence in reunified Germany.
Need for targeted moral education programs addressing generational differences in ethical decision-making
Consider generational and regional differences when designing anti-corruption policies and institutional reforms
Address perceived inequalities between East and West Germany to mitigate moral disengagement among younger East Germans
This study provides crucial insights into how institutional transformation affects moral behavior across generations. The findings have important implications for understanding corruption, cultural transmission, and the long-term effects of political and economic system changes on individual moral considerations.
The research contributes to the broader discourse on market effects on morals and provides empirical evidence for the complex relationship between institutional environments and individual ethical behavior.
C91, D73, D91, J14, P51